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PRIVATE OPTIONS TO USE PUBLIC GOODS
EXPLOITING REVEALED PREFERENCES
TO ESTIMATE ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS
Lori D. Snyder, Robert N. Stavins and Alexander F. Wagner
*
We develop and apply a new method for estimating the economic benefits of an environmental amenity.  The
method fits within the household production framework (Becker 1965), and is based upon the notion of estimating the
derived demand for a privately traded option to utilize a freely-available public good.  In particular, the demand for state
fishing licenses is used to infer the benefits of recreational fishing.  Using panel data on state fishing license sales and
prices for the continental United States over a fifteen-year period, combined with data on substitute prices and
demographic variables, a license demand function is estimated with instrumental variable procedures to allow for the
potential endogeneity of administered prices.  The econometric results lead to estimates of the benefits of a fishing
license, and subsequently to the expected benefits of a recreational fishing day.  In contrast with previous studies, which
have utilized travel cost or hypothetical market methods, our approach provides estimates that are directly comparable
across geographic areas.  Further, our results suggest that the benefits of recreational fishing days are generally less than
previously estimated.
1.  INTRODUCTION
When considering a number of disparate environmental and natural resource issues, policy
makers may wish to have estimates of the economic value of a day of recreational fishing.  Indeed,
in the past, such estimates have been used in analyses of the consequences of:  new dams and
reservoirs, improvements in water quality, cleanups of abandoned hazardous waste sites, and
reductions in the magnitude of global climate change.  Virtually all of these estimates have been
made with one of two methods:  contingent valuation, a direct survey approach employing
hypothetical constructed markets; or travel-cost, an indirect market-based method.  The use — more
broadly — of the first of these approaches has generated considerable controversy within
economics;
1 and both approaches require large quantities of geographically specific data. 
In this context, it is of interest to have an independent set of estimates —  based upon a
conceptually distinct, revealed-preference approach — of the economic benefits of a recreational
fishing-day.  Our methodology differs from previous studies in two important respects.  First, we
estimate willingness-to-pay for a recreational fishing day from observed behavior regarding the
purchase of fishing licenses, rather than observed behavior regarding travel to sites or stated2Other direct, revealed-preference methods that have been used for examining environmental amenities and that require
detailed micro-data — hedonic property and wage models — have not been applied to estimating the value of
recreational fishing days (Freeman 2003).  In principle, a sport fishing demand function could also be estimated in some
cases by drawing on data from pay-for-use facilities, such as private, managed trout ponds, where users are charged for
access or use (Vaughan and Russell 1982).
3Seneca and Davis (1976), in an analysis of the factors affecting participation in recreational activities, carried out a
county-level, cross-sectional econometric analysis of the factors affecting fishing license sales in West Virginia in 1970.
Because there was no variation in license prices in the cross section, price could not be included as an explanatory
variable.  
4We return later to the possibility that the license provides its owner with the option to go fishing, and thereby that
simply expecting to go fishing is all that is required for a person to derive benefits from owning a license.
5For a detailed theory of the utilization of recreational fisheries, see:  Anderson 1993.
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preferences regarding those sites.  Second, the two existing approaches
2 use detailed micro-data (of
observations of opportunity costs of travel or respondents’ explicit estimates of willingness-to-pay)
to develop benefit estimates specific to particular bodies of water.  This is both their advantage and
disadvantage.  In contrast, the approach developed in this paper uses aggregate data at the state level
to derive estimates — in a national modeling framework — of state averages of recreational
benefits.
3 As a result, our state estimates are directly comparable among one another, allowing
inferences to be made about relative recreational benefits across geographic areas with more
confidence than is possible based on previously available methods.
Given these methodological differences, it is perhaps not surprising that our results differ —
in some cases significantly — from those previously available.  In particular, our estimates are
generally lower — in some cases, much lower — than those from previous studies.
1.1  Overview of Method
Throughout the United States, a state fishing license is required for recreational fishing on
any and all bodies of water, with the exception of privately own ponds.  Thus, apart from the
possibility of illegal fishing activity, to which we return below, a license is a necessary condition
for deriving benefits from a day of recreational fishing.  Likewise, apart from the relatively rare
urbanite who may enjoy displaying to others an (unused) fishing license, experiencing some fishing
days is a necessary prerequisite for deriving benefits from owning a fishing license.
4
Building upon the household production approach to consumer behavior (Becker 1965),
Bockstael and McConnell (1983) identified the conditions under which empirical knowledge of the
demand function for a private, market good could be used to infer the benefits derived from a related
public good.   In a simple model,
5 let X be the number of fishing days experienced, L a fishing
license, and Z a composite of other goods and services.  If utility is defined by the function,
then the above situation can be represented by the following pair of marginal utility relationships:6Hawaii is excluded from the analysis because the structure of license demand does not match the rest of the United
States, and Tennessee is excluded because it does not sell a fishing license per se, but a “Sportsman License,” which
can be used for both hunting and fishing. 
7Since our motivation and contribution is largely methodological in nature, we have chosen a time period for our
analysis for which a large number of previous studies exist, the results of which can be compared with our own.  In any
event, it is highly unlikely that fishable waters have changed in the interim to such degree as to change significantly our
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defining what McConnell (1992) terms “joint weak complementarity.”  Thus, we can employ
information about peoples’ revealed valuation of fishing licenses, measured by the appropriate area
under the respective demand functions, to draw inferences regarding their revealed valuation of
(expected) recreational fishing days (Smith 1991).
The first step is to estimate econometrically a set of demand functions for state annual
recreational fishing licenses.  By measuring the appropriate area under the (state-specific) inverse
demand function, we can estimate the average benefits per capita of fishing licenses.  Further
manipulation leads to an estimate of the average benefits of fishing licenses per license (again,
specific to states and years).  From this we derive a revealed-preference estimate of the expected
value of a recreational fishing day.  This value can be compared with estimates derived in previous
studies by contingent valuation, travel cost, or other methods.
1.2  Preview of the Paper
In Part 2, we describe our data, and in Part 3, we describe the econometric analysis, including
the results from ordinary least squares (OLS) and instrumental variables (IV) regressions.  In Part
4, we use the econometric results from the IV equations to derive estimates of average expected
recreational fishing day values, and we compare these estimates with results from previous studies.
In Part 5, we review methodological implications and reflect on the numerical results.
2.  DATA
Recreational fishing licenses are sold by all fifty states.  In all cases, prices are
administratively set by state governments, and licenses are sold without limit.  This study focuses
on a panel of licenses sold in 48 states
6 over a 15-year period (1975 to 1989).
7  We aggregated the
numerous types of fishing licenses that exist into ten categories.  All states offered both resident and8Two states — Montana and Wyoming — required the purchase of a “conservation stamp” in addition to a fishing
license.  The cost of the stamp was added to the price of a license.
9These and all other monetary amounts in this paper are expressed in year 2000 dollars.
10Under these conditions, the observed price-quantity combinations are the intersections of infinitely elastic license
supply functions (one for each price) and an assumed downward-sloping license demand function.  This situation
contrasts with hunting licenses, which are not sold without limit in most states.  At administered prices, there are
typically shortages, which are dealt with in various ways, including random lotteries and waiting lists.  Because of this
difference, the approach described in this paper is not directly applicable to valuing a recreational hunting day.
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nonresident licenses, the former at lower prices.  Resident annual licenses were by far the most
popular type, with sales of more than 257 million over the 15-year sample period, representing about
two-thirds of all licenses sold (Table 1).
8  Second in numerical importance were resident
“combination licenses” that allow for both hunting and fishing during a given year.
Various duration short-term fishing licenses were also available to residents in many states;
these allowed for as little as a single day or as much as two weeks of fishing, but — in total — made
up only 3 percent of all resident fishing license sales.  In contrast, nonresident license sales were
much more heavily weighted toward short-term permits.  In fact, about 65 percent of all nonresident
fishing license sales during the sample period were of short-term licenses (Table 1).
There was substantial variation in aggregate and per capita sales of the various types of
licenses.  The variation was greatest across states, but was also significant within states over time.
For example, in the final year of the sample, 1989, resident annual license sales ranged from about
one percent to over 25 percent of state population.  There was also considerable variation in (real)
license prices across states and over time.  In the case of resident annual licenses, for example, the
range in the sample was from a minimum of $3.79 to a maximum of $32.80
9 (Table 2).  In the final
year of the sample, the range was from $7.63 (Minnesota) to $26.73 (Colorado).  The variation was
even greater for some of the other license categories.  For example, in 1989, the minimum price of
a nonresident annual license was $16.66 (South Dakota) and the maximum was $69.44 (California).
In addition to the license price and quantity information, data were assembled on various
demographic, political, and environmental variables that were thought to be relevant to license
demand or necessary for establishing the links between license demand and participants’ expected
benefits of a recreational fishing day.  These data are summarized in Table 2 and discussed in the
next section.
3.  ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF LICENSE DEMAND
Since license prices are set administratively by states, and licenses are sold without limit, the
quantity sold at various prices traces out a demand function if the administratively set prices are
exogenously determined and if any relevant variables that are omitted are uncorrelated with the
license price.
10  The first set of variables — in addition to the license price itself — that would seem
to be relevant are the prices of major substitutes.  In this analysis we focus on the demand for
resident annual fishing licenses, and therefore the relevant substitute prices include the price of11A problem arises in specifying which state licenses are relevant as substitutes.  We constructed a variable that is a
weighted average of prices of specified types of nonresident licenses in adjacent states and Canadian provinces.
12Note that this variable varies not only across states, but also over time, reflecting both development of new reservoirs
and changes in water quality.
13To whatever degree the holders of annual licenses have greater or lesser fishing-day valuations than holders of other
categories of fishing licenses, the eventual results will tend to over or under-estimate average state valuations.
14These equations were also estimated with sales as the dependent variable and state population as an independent
variable; the estimated parameters on population were not significantly different from 1.0 (in the primitive equations).
An additional reason for estimating the demand equations in per capita terms was to reduce potential problems
associated with heteroskedasticity in the error terms.
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resident short-term fishing licenses, the price of resident combination fishing and hunting licenses,
and the price of nonresident licenses in adjacent states.
11
Presumably, the characteristics of demanders are also relevant, and we therefore included
the following demographic variables in the resident license demand estimation:  median family
income; mean years of education; and the share of the population living in urban areas.  Finally, the
nature of available recreational fishing resources in states should affect demand for state fishing
licenses.  We dealt with this in two ways.  First, we included a variable that measures acres of
“fishable waters” per state,
12 but this treats all fishing resources as being homogeneous in terms of
the experiences they offer.  Clearly, this is not correct.  An acre of pristine, high-quality Colorado
mountain stream is not equivalent to an acre of Ohio reservoir.  The omitted variable — quality of
fishing waters — is likely to be important and may be correlated with license price, hence causing
biased estimates of demand elasticity.  The problem presented by such unobserved quality is not
insurmountable, because although quality variation is dramatic across states, quality variation within
states over time is trivial by comparison.  Hence, we can model this unobserved factor as a fixed
effect.
This leaves one concern regarding the possibility of inferring a true demand relationship
from econometric estimates:  is it supply, demand, or some combination of the two that is being
observed?  In other words, are price and quantity simultaneously determined, or are prices
exogenously set by states?  A reasonable first approximation is that the administered prices are set
exogenously by state officials, and so we begin with ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates.  But
it is not difficult to posit theories of administered prices that support the notion that these prices are
endogenous.  Hence, we follow the OLS estimates with a set of specifications in which we treat the
license price as endogenous, and estimate the relationships with instrumental variable (IV) methods.
3.1  Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Estimation
Resident annual licenses comprise approximately two-thirds of all fishing licenses sold in
the United States.
13  For resident license demand, the dependent variable was expressed as sales per
capita.
14  Fixed effects were employed to control for constant differences among states in the
quantity and quality of their recreational fishing resources.  Thus, for various specifications of the
demand for resident annual licenses, we have:15But when the full menu of substitute prices were included, some of the respective parameters were insignificant and
negative.  The prices of nonresident licenses in neighboring states performed particularly poorly.  This could be because
the simple arithmetic average of neighboring state prices does not correctly capture the role that neighboring state
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where     Qit = quantity of sales of resident annual license in state i in year t;
   Nit = population of state i in year t;
   Pit =  price of resident annual license in state i in year t;
Pit
S1 = price of short-term, type 1 (1-3 day) resident license in state i in year t;
Dit
S1 = dummy variable which equals unity if a short-term, type 1 resident license is not
offered in state i in year t, and otherwise equals zero;
Pit
S2 = price of short-term, type 2 (4-9 day) resident license in state i in year t;
Dit
S2 = dummy variable which equals unity if a short-term, type 2 resident license is not
offered in state i in year t, and otherwise equals zero;
Pit
S3 = price of short-term, type 3 (10-15 days) resident license in state i in year t;
Dit
S3 = dummy variable which equals unity if a short-term, type 3 resident license is not
offered in state i in year t, and otherwise equals zero;
Pit
NR = average price of adjacent state nonresident annual licenses for state i in year t;
  Fit = area of fishable waters (acres) in state i in year t; 
 Uit = share of population living in urban areas in state i in year t; 
 Eit = mean years of education of population in state i in year t;
 Yit = median family income in state i in year t;
    Di = state fixed effects; 
    Dt = annual fixed effects;
  εit = an independent, but not necessarily homoscedastic error term; 
  β = parameters to be estimated.
The results of estimating the fixed effects models of demand for resident annual fishing
license are reported in Table 3 for three functional forms:  linear; multiplicative (log-log); and
semilog.  For each functional form, we report two specifications:  one includes the prices of all
relevant substitutes as explanatory variables; and the other includes only the price of short-term
Type 1 licenses plus dummy variables for each year.
In general, estimated own price effects were negative and statistically significant, and
substitute price effects were positive, as expected.
15  The parsimonious specification that includedfishing opportunities play in the demand for resident annual licenses.  If sufficient data were available, it would be
preferable to allow the econometrics to determine the appropriate weighting of the neighboring state prices.
16The latter specification includes dummy variables for each year in the sample.  On average, nominal license prices
changed only 2.5 times per state over the 15-year sample period.  Therefore, much (but not all) of the intertemporal
variation in prices consists of gradually declining real prices.  If, at the same time, sales were drifting upward, this
would yield a negative correlation, but not one due to price-quantity demand effects.  The yearly dummy variables were
included to examine this potential problem.  However, their inclusion did not materially affect the results, and so it
appears unlikely that the observed negative price elasticities were due to such spurious correlation.
17A Hausman specification test consistently rejected the hypothesis that state-level variation could be adequately
modeled as a random effect.  
18The estimated elasticities at the mean from the other specifications are roughly consistent with these constant
elasticities of demand. 
19Not all states offer all categories of substitute (short-term) licenses during all time periods.  In a sense, the “prices”
of these non-existent licenses are infinite.  The various specifications allow for the effect of some type of license not
being available through the inclusion of dummy variables, Dit, where (1-Dit) is interacted with the respective license
price, so that for each observation either a substitute price effect or a lack-of-substitute effect is estimated.  In theory,
both should be positive, which they consistently were.
20If we were concerned with the demand for fishing licenses per se, then illegal fishing would not be a problem for the
econometrics; indeed, in that case it is important to exclude illegal fishing, as the data implicitly do.  Why might one
be interested in license demand in and of itself?  One reason is that such an analysis can provide the relevant elasticities
for examining revenue and other effects of fishing license taxes of various forms.
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only short-term Type 1 resident licenses as substitutes consistently yielded positive and statistically
significant coefficients (for all three functional forms).
16  Goodness-of-fit statistics were reasonably
good for these fixed-effects models, with R
2 on the order of .15 to .23; not surprisingly, the complete
models — including the fixed effects — explain a much greater share of the observed variance.
17
It is simplest to consider the results from the multiplicative (log-log) specification, because
the estimated coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities.  The own-price elasticity was
consistently – 0.19 to – 0.20.
18  The cross-price elasticities (of substitute licenses) were all positive
in the parsimonious specification, and quite small.
19  The attempt to capture (partially) resource-
quality effects with the fishable waters variable met with limited success.  The variable was
consistently positive and statistically significant, but the elasticities were small.  Presumably, much
of the variation in the quality of fishing resources across states was picked up by the fixed effects.
Finally, the demographic variables seem to have had some effect on fishing license demand, but
while the signs were consistent across specifications, the statistical significance and magnitude of
the effects varied.  In several specifications, income was positive and statistically significant.  In
other specifications, years of education was negative and significant.
3.2  Potential Problems
These results raise two major concerns:  the effect of illegal fishing activity on the estimates;
and the possibility of endogeneity of license prices.  Since the purpose of econometrically estimating
fishing license demand is to derive implied valuations of expected recreational fishing days, it is
necessary to consider the implications of illegal fishing, that is, fishing without a license.
20  This, by21To whatever degree these factors and their effects vary across states but are constant over time, they are picked up by
the state fixed effects.
22A more serious problem arises, however, if illegal fishing increases when license prices increase, perhaps as a form
of protest.  If this is the case, then demand responsiveness will be overestimated and the benefits of licenses will be
underestimated.
23A third potential problem with the fixed effects estimation results presented in the previous section is that the fixed
effects model allows the intercept to vary, but other demand parameters are constrained to be equal across states.  The
data do not permit estimation of separate demand functions for each state.
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itself, need not be a problem given the approach that is taken below to derive valuation from license
demand, but it can lead to bias in the econometric estimates.
A theoretically desirable way of treating illegal fishing in the license demand equation would
be to allow for this particular substitute activity.  Hence, we would want to include as an explanatory
variable the “price” of illegal fishing, which may be thought of as the magnitude of fines multiplied
by the probability of being fined.  Unfortunately, these fines are typically set by courts, not by
statute or regulation, and data even for proxies of the probability of being fined (enforcement levels)
are rarely available.
21  Although it is reasonable to assume that the true “price of illegal fishing” is
positively correlated with the demand for fishing licenses, it is much less clear how it is correlated
with license prices, if at all.  Hence, omitting this variable may not seriously bias the elasticity
estimates.
22
There is also the possibility that license prices, administratively set by governments, are
endogenous, that is, that causality runs not only from price to quantity, but vice-versa.  How could
this be the case?  One potential source of such a causal linkage would be state budgets.  States might
seek to set license prices at levels that cover annual budgets of fish and game services, assumed to
be more or less fixed over time.  In the time series for a single state, this could yield a negative
correlation between quantity of license sales and administered price (recognizing that this assumes
that states can predict sales).
Another potential explanation for a spurious, negative price-quantity correlation is associated
with persons sorting themselves for residence among states.  People with strong preferences for
fishing may be expected to exert political pressure to keep license prices low.  If people with strong
preferences for fishing move to relatively good fishing states (or develop preferences for fishing as
a result of having been born and raised in such a state), then states with large quantities of license
sales could tend to have relatively low prices, suggesting a source of spurious, negative cross-
sectional correlation.   We allow for price endogeneity by identifying a set of instruments for license
price, and using instrumental variables in what is essentially a reduced form approach.
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3.3  Instrumental Variable (IV) Estimation
To address possible price endogeneity, we wanted an instrument or set of instruments that
would be correlated with resident annual license prices, but uncorrelated with the error term
(uncorrelated with license sales), that is, exogenous to the demand for fishing licenses.  Since license
prices were administratively set in each state, a reasonable set of instruments would be ones that are24This suggests that whatever endogeneity underlies these results, it is not due to either of the linkages posited above,
both of which suggested a negative bias for the OLS results.  A Hausman specification test can be used to test whether
the coefficients in the OLS and IV regressions are statistically different.  Using this test, we cannot reject the null
hypothesis that the coefficients are the same, that is, we cannot reject the hypothesis that OLS is the correct model.  But
the Hausman test looks at the weighted difference of all the coefficients, and we are only concerned with whether the
price coefficient is statistically different.  A different test regresses the license price on the instrumental variables and
then includes the predicted price from this first-stage regression as an explanatory variable (in addition to the licence
price itself) in the quantity regression.  If the coefficient on the predicted price variable is statistically significant, then
it is drawing variance from the error term that would otherwise be attributed to the price variable.  This would be what
we would expect if the price variable was endogenous.  We found that the predicted price variable was consistently
insignificant when included in the quantity regression.  Therefore, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the price
variables is exogenous.
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indicative of bureaucratic and political proclivities of states, such as the size of government, and the
degree of regulation and taxation.  In particular, it would be desirable to have instruments that
represent states’ (possibly changing) proclivities to employ user fees as opposed to taxes and
regulations.  These proclivities might be correlated with the administrative price of the fishing
licenses, but it is less likely that they would be correlated with the quantity of fishing licenses sold.
The set of instruments used in this analysis were:  cigarette taxes (cents per package); motor
fuels taxes cents per gallon); general sales taxes (percent); and state expenditures (millions of
dollars).  The IV regression results are reported for the parsimonious specification for all three
functional forms in Table 4.  The results were robust to different specifications, including changes
in the list of substitute prices and changes in the demographic variables.  The parameters on the price
and fishable waters variables are all of the logical sign and statistically significant, although several
are quite small in magnitude.  The demographic variable parameters are all of the expected sign,
although some are not statistically different from zero.  The own-price elasticity of demand is
consistently greater (in absolute value) in the IV estimates than in the OLS estimates.
24
4.  ESTIMATING THE VALUE OF A RECREATIONAL FISHING DAY
Three steps were required to derive the (state and year specific) average expected value of
a recreational fishing day from the econometrically estimated demand functions for fishing licenses:
derive average benefits of fishing licenses per capita from an estimated demand function; calculate
average benefits per licensee; and estimate average expected value of a recreational fishing day.
4.1  Estimating Average Benefits of Owning Fishing Licenses from the Demand Function
To derive the average benefits of a fishing license (in per capita terms), we begin with an
equation for which the parameters have been estimated econometrically.  Consider the instrumental
variables setup reported in Table 4.  From the estimated demand curve, we can obtain point
estimates as well as uncertainty estimates (in the form of a variance-covariance matrix).  We begin
with calculations based on the point estimates.
We first set all variables — with the exception of the (annual resident) license price and the
dependent variable (sales per capita) — equal to their actual values for a given state and year.  Also,
we set all parameters at their econometrically estimated values.  The inverted form of the resulting25This cutoff corresponds to the highest price actually charged for a license in our sample ($32.80), and provides a very
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equation  (that is, the inverse demand function) is then integrated between the actual per capita
demand (sales per capita) and zero (or an appropriate cutoff value for the log-log specification),
yielding an estimate of the (revealed) benefits per capita of fishing licenses for each state and year.
Multiplying by the state’s population produces an estimate of the total benefits of licenses; and
dividing this by license sales yields an estimate of the  average revealed benefits of owning a fishing
license per licensee:
where f(@)  = inverse demand function;
qit   = per capita sales of resident annual licenses in state i in year t;
c    =  appropriate cutoff (zero for the linear and semi-log specifications of the demand
curve);
αit = the fitted value from setting all variables — other than (annual resident) license price
and the dependent variable — equal to their actual values for state i in year t, and all
parameters, including the relevant fixed, state effect, at their econometrically
estimated values; 
β0 = the estimated own-price elasticity of demand; and
BL = average benefits of owning a fishing license (per licensee).
We primarily employ the log-log specification of the demand function for benefit-estimation
purposes, because we believe on theoretical grounds that the demand for fishing licenses is unlikely
to be linear, and because the log-log form consistently provides a better fit than the semi-log
functional form.  With this specification, however, it is impossible to integrate the demand curve
between zero and actual per capita sales, qit, and so we need to identify a limit for purposes of
integration.  We examined a variety of such cutoff values, including $33,
25 $100, $200, and $500.
The estimates implied by the log-log specification with a cutoff of $200 are similar to those implied
by the semi-log specification, and so we later focus on these results.  It is important to note,
however, that the relative magnitudes of the estimated benefits of recreational fishing across states
do not change with different cutoff values.
4.2  Estimating the Expected Value of a Recreational Fishing Day
Since an annual fishing license is essentially an option to purchase (through direct
expenditures plus opportunity costs of time) some number of days of recreational fishing experience
(up to the total number of days in the season), it would seem that the stochastic relationship between
a fishing license and the experiences it can facilitate would bring forth an important component of
“option value.”  After all, no one knows with certainty how many days they will be able to go26It is also true that an annual fishing license could offer option value for someone who decided he wanted to go fishing
(for the first time in a season) in the middle of the night, when local outlets for purchasing a short-term license are
closed.  But this does not represent an important class of exceptions. 
11
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fishing during a season.  Two conditions, however, essentially undue the option value, and make it
possible to infer user value directly.  First, annual license sales continue throughout the season, up
until the very last day.  Hence, there is no necessity to purchase a license before the time of one’s
first expedition.  Second, numerous short-term licenses (substitutes) are always available.
26
Thus, if short-term licenses did not exist and if there were an early deadline for purchasing
annual licenses, then it could be argued that any valuation linked with licenses would include both
user and option value.  In the absence of those conditions, however, it seems more reasonable to
assume that the benefits of a fishing license are linked with expected use value.  If we assume  that
consumers are risk neutral in regard to their fishing license purchases and that the duration of a
fishing season is short enough that discounting is not a significant issue, then we can derive the
approximate conditional value of an expected fishing day in a very direct manner from the license
demand evidence.  First, we can say that:
where BFD is the benefit (value) of a recreational fishing day; and S is the number of days in the
season.  Since the probability that the benefits are positive will be equivalent to the expected number
of days of recreational fishing experienced, E[d], divided by the length in days of the season, S, we
have the following:
Thus, we can approximate the conditional value of an expected recreational fishing day by
dividing the revealed valuation of an annual license by the expected number of fishing days.  This
is subject to four caveats.  First, these relationships assume risk neutrality. If license purchasers are
risk averse, then we will over-estimate the daily valuation.  This seems, however, to be a second-
order problem.  Second, we have ignored discounting, but it is unlikely to amount to a significant
error (relative to econometric and other sources of error), considering the length of the fishing
season.  Third, this assumes independence of the valuation of each day, but if there is declining
marginal valuation of fishing days by license holders and serial correlation among days of
participation, then such independence does not hold.  Fourth, depending upon the nature of
unobserved heterogeneity among licensees within states, the aggregation may not produce the
correct weighted average.
This takes us to the point of estimating the average expected number of fishing days per
licensee per state per year, E [dit].  Various approaches to this problem exist, but a reasonable27As reported in U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (1975, 1980, 1985, and 1991), the surveys provide annual estimates of
state-level total days of recreational fishing (separately by residents and nonresidents) and the number of participants.
The estimates from those five years were interpolated to provide a set of annual estimates for the period, 1975-1989.
The U.S. average over this time period is about 20 days per year for residents and 10 days per year for nonresidents.
28The large confidence intervals we estimate for the highest-valuation states under the log-log specifications can be
misleading, however, because of the extremely asymmetric distribution of mass within them.  Note the location of the
expected value (mean), relative to the 90% confidence limits, for example in the case of Colorado:  the confidence
bounds are 13.13 and 42.03, and the mean is 13.78.
29We only consider states in Table 6 for which previous studies exist of the time period employed in our analysis and
for which our results yield estimates that are statistically different from zero.
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approximation is simply to use the actual numbers, which are periodically compiled at the state level
by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS).
27  This may impart a slight upward bias to the final
results, since the FWS numbers refer to all (resident) participants, not only annual license holders.
Some of these are short-term license holders, who likely go fishing less frequently.  But the
overwhelming majority of licenses sold are annual licenses, implying that this problem will not be
important.  A final point concerns uncertainty estimates. We use Monte Carlo procedures to simulate
confidence intervals for the benefits of a recreational fishing day. 
The results from this analysis are summarized in Table 5, which provides an overview of
benefit estimates derived with the various specifications (all estimated as IV regressions), averaged
over the sample period.  Our results provide evidence of substantial heterogeneity among states in
the expected value of a recreational fishing day.  The mountain states plus Alaska, Arkansas, and
Minnesota exhibit valuations that are ten or even twenty times the magnitude of the estimates for
the lowest value states, such as Delaware, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island.  This should not be
surprising, and any absence of such dramatic contrasts in previous studies might even be a source
of concern.  Our results reflect considerable uncertainty.  The 90% confidence intervals are typically
large, both in absolute terms and relative to the estimated benefits of recreational fishing.
28
In Table 6, we contrast our estimates with previous estimates of the value of a recreational
fishing day, drawing upon a number of earlier studies that used either contingent valuation or travel-
cost methods (but typically do not report confidence bounds).
29  Our results are generally much
lower than previous estimates.  Perhaps more important than the differences in absolute numbers,
however, are the relative estimates of the benefits of recreational fishing.  No matter which
specification we use, the findings imply that fishing in states such as Colorado, Minnesota, Oregon,
and Wisconsin, for example, conveys much greater recreational value than fishing in many other
areas.  Hence, a policymaker who were to extrapolate findings from site-specific studies of fishing
in Oregon, for example, to other parts of the country could be employing a significantly biased
estimate.  This would suggest particular caution when using so-called “benefit transfer” methods as
frequently employed by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and other regulatory agencies.
Throughout the above discussion, we emphasized factors that could alter our findings.  First,
if there is significant option value of licenses, the actual (use value) benefits of recreational fishing
would be even less than estimated here. Second, if illegal fishing increases when license prices
increase, demand responsiveness will be overestimated, implying that the benefits of licenses are
underestimated.  Third, to the extent that other license holders may have systematically different13
valuations than annual license holders, our estimates will be affected.  Fourth, our calculation of the
expected number of fishing days relies upon USFWS statistics, which may contain errors of their
own.
5.  CONCLUSION
As an alternative means of estimating — on an aggregate basis — the value of a recreational
fishing day, the method developed here holds promise.  There is ongoing controversy surrounding
the use of the contingent valuation (CV) and other hypothetical market methods for environmental-
benefit estimation.  Furthermore, the data requirements of the CV (and other survey methods) and
travel cost models are severe, and hence the expense of carrying out such analyses is a major
impediment to their use.  For this reason, government agencies such as the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency rarely carry out original analyses, typically relying instead on “benefit transfers”
from previous studies.  Given these realities, it is of considerable value to have access to a
conceptually distinct method of estimating environmental values that is based upon a revealed-
preference, econometric framework.
Our numerical estimates of recreational fishing-day values suggest great variation across
geographic areas, and considerably lower values than previously reported.  Since previous studies
have been of single sites or single states, there was inevitably some question as to whether and to
what degree any observed variations were due to real differences in values, as opposed to differences
among respective models.  Although our approach may suffer from being a macro-oriented approach
— in contrast with survey methods and travel-cost models that focus on single sites — this is also
an advantage, because it facilitates the development of a set of mutually consistent estimates that
can be effectively compared with one another over time and space.aRounded to the nearest 1,000.
b"Combination" licenses cover both fishing and hunting on an annual basis.
c"Short-Term Type 1" licenses are temporary fishing licenses, ranging in length from 1 to 3 days.
d"Short-Term Type 2" licenses are temporary fishing licenses, ranging in length from 4 to 9 days.
e"Short-Term Type 3" licenses are temporary fishing licenses, ranging in length from 10 to 15 days.
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TABLE 1:
MAJOR CATEGORIES OF RECREATIONAL FISHING LICENSES
CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES, 1975-1989
License Type
Total License Sales






Resident Annual 257,054,000 67.6%   720
Resident Combination
b  52,690,000 13.9%   481
Resident Short-Term 1
c    9,661,000   2.5%   203
Resident Short-Term 2
d     349,000  0.1%    71
Resident Short-Term 3
e     986,000  0.3%    29
Nonresident Annual   20,059,000  5.3%   709
Nonresident Combination      795,000  0.2%   118
Nonresident Short-Term 1  17,022,000  4.5%   378
Nonresident Short-Term 2   15,034,000  4.0%   422
Nonresident Short-Term 3    6,374,000  1.7%   203
All License Categories 380,024,000  100% 3,305aFor states and time periods where particular types of licenses did not exist, "zero observations" have been eliminated
before calculation of descriptive statistics.  The unit of observation for the table is a state in a given year; there is no
weighting to account for the underlying samples of unequal size.
bAll monetary amounts throughout the paper are expressed in 2000 dollars.
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TABLE 2:









Quantity of Resident Annual
Licenses per State
357,019 362,301 10,925 2,293,671 720
Quantity Per Capita of Resident
Annual Licenses
0.091 0.050 0.010 0.249 720
Price of Resident Annual
Licenses
$14.89
b 3.48 $3.79 $32.80 720
Quantity of Resident
Combination Licenses per State
109,543 104,386 5,059 724,990 481
Quantity Per Capita of Resident
Combination Licenses
0.044 0.038 0.001 0.207 481
Price of Resident Combination
Licenses
$29.02 7.84 $10.44 $72.02 481
Quantity of Resident Type 1
Short-Term Licenses per State
47,590 64,300 194 307,893 203
Quantity Per Capita of Resident
Type 1 Short-Term Licenses
0.015 0.015 0.0004 0.077 203
Price of Resident Type 1 Short-
Term Licenses
$9.01 3.47 $1.74 $31.77 203
Quantity of Resident Type 2
Short-Term Licenses per State
 4,909  5,217 151 17,947 71
Quantity Per Capita of Resident
Type 2 Short-Term Licenses
0.005 0.007 0.0001 0.026 71
Price of Resident Type 2 Short-
Term Licenses
$13.43 3.36 $5.30 $22.69 71
Quantity of Resident Type 3
Short-Term Licenses per State
 34,000 20,657  93 74,141 29
Quantity Per Capita of Resident
Type 3 Short-Term Licenses
0.007 0.005 0.0001 0.018 29
Price of Resident Type 3 Short-
Term Licenses
$6.69 1.20 $4.14 $10.44 2916
TABLE 2 (CONTINUED):









Annual Licenses per State
28,292 36,570 1,232 224,850 709
Price of Nonresident Annual
Licenses
$35.65 11.09 $6.40 $85.96 709
Quantity of Nonresident
Combination Licenses per State
6,741 20,344 10 103,921 118
Price of Nonresident
Combination Licenses
$97.52 40.10 $7.86 $250.08 118
Quantity of Nonresident Type 1
Short-Term Licenses per State
45,031 42,310 562 216,568 378
Price of Nonresident Type 1
Short-Term Licenses
$11.07 3.58 $2.64 $31.77 378
Quantity of Nonresident Type 2
Short-Term Licence's per State
35,625 38,964 661 180,712 422
Price of Nonresident Type 2
Short-Term Licenses
$16.93 5.37 $3.79 $43.33 422
Quantity of Nonresident Type 3
Short-Term Licences per State
31,398 30,568 1 185,187 203
Price of Nonresident Type 3
Short-Term Licenses
$22.19 7.26 $6.15 $47.13 203
Median Income (for four-
person families)
$51,585 5,072 $36,956 $91,269 720
Share of State Population
Residing in Metro. Areas
0.614 0.230 0.126 1.000 720
Mean Years of Schooling 12.67 0.40 11.54 13.54 720
State Population 4,673,888 4,911,251 377,000 29,063,00  720
State Area (in square miles) 74,377 88,748 1,212 591,004 720
Total Area of Fishable Waters
(in acres)
1,845,732 4,054,958 5,983 25,416,00 72017
TABLE 3:





















































































































































Annual Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Number of
Observations
720 720 720 720 720 720
R
2 (Within) .251 .232 .274 .233 .243 .200
Note:  Robust Standard Errors are in parentheses below respective parameter estimates
*** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level18
TABLE 4:





Price of Resident Annual License -.0020268 *** -.0394666 ** -.3523899 **
(.00061) (.01913) (.17869)
Price of Short-term Type 1
License
.001233 *** .0079709 *** .0798971 **
(.00036) (.00255) (.03264)
Dummy/ No Short-term Type 1
License
.0130771 *** .0182087 *** .1665044 ***
(.00277) (.00468) (.05844)
Acres of Fishable Waters 3.45 x 10
-9 *** .0100813 *** .0927085 ***
(6.73 x 10
-10) (.00313) (.02912)




Median Family Income 5.17 x 10
-7 .0218192 .3563928 ***
(3.44 x 
10-7) (.01305) (.11421)
Mean Years of Education -.0010463 -.0486377 -1.092323
(.00359) (.06297) (.72027)
Annual Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 720 720 720
R-squared (within) 0.225 0.0682 0.1464
Note:  Robust Standard Errors are in parentheses below respective parameter estimates
*** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level19
TABLE 5:
ESTIMATES OF THE VALUE OF A FRESHWATER RECREATIONAL FISHING DAY



















Alabama 2.63 3.86 2.61 4.23 5.72 8.52 1.14 13.12 5.08 30.84
Alaska 5.58 37.23 14.13 22.94 31.01 46.17 8.95 155.96 16.34 1901.03
Arizona 2.96 2.81 1.82 2.95 3.99 5.94 0.73 10.82 1.51 7.14
Arkansas 3.93 20.03 8.11 13.17 17.80 26.50 4.53 89.68 10.72 681.15
California 3.04 3.66 2.51 4.08 5.51 8.21 0.80 16.83 3.00 8.91
Colorado 4.60 8.79 6.28 10.20 13.78 20.52 1.81 43.20 13.13 42.03
Connecticut 1.33 1.13 0.44 0.72 0.97 1.45 0.28 4.59 0.06 3.21
Delaware 1.08 0.79 0.18 0.30 0.40 0.60 0.23 2.74 0.00 2.13
Florida 1.06 0.87 0.39 0.63 0.85 1.26 0.23 3.30 0.08 2.50
Georgia 2.20 2.28 1.66 2.69 3.63 5.41 0.70 7.51 3.44 6.09
Idaho 3.92 6.93 5.00 8.12 10.98 16.34 1.49 32.50 10.50 30.14
Illinois 1.86 1.36 0.75 1.23 1.66 2.47 0.42 4.44 0.32 3.68
Indiana 1.95 1.71 1.13 1.83 2.47 3.68 0.49 6.01 1.02 4.35
Iowa 2.84 3.42 2.49 4.04 5.46 8.13 0.90 13.11 4.96 8.57
Kansas 2.56 3.56 2.56 4.15 5.61 8.36 0.79 16.23 4.81 8.46
Kentucky 2.56 3.45 2.51 4.08 5.51 8.20 0.85 14.07 5.21 9.79
Louisiana 1.68 0.96 0.68 1.10 1.49 2.22 0.42 2.20 1.15 2.22
Maine 3.02 4.50 3.17 5.14 6.95 10.34 0.84 24.17 4.86 10.54
Maryland 1.66 1.38 0.34 0.55 0.74 1.11 0.35 5.44 0.01 3.63
Massachusetts 1.25 1.24 0.20 0.33 0.45 0.66 0.23 6.72 0.00 3.05
Michigan 2.61 3.17 2.25 3.66 4.94 7.36 0.78 12.92 4.01 7.49
Minnesota 5.02 17.98 9.81 15.93 21.53 32.05 3.73 87.01 15.28 362.81
Mississippi 1.36 0.92 0.46 0.75 1.01 1.51 0.30 2.87 0.12 2.60
Missouri 2.80 3.42 2.48 4.03 5.45 8.11 0.91 12.95 5.12 9.18
Montana 6.45 46.86 16.56 26.88 36.32 54.08 9.51 233.36 20.20 1843.60
Nebraska 3.06 4.71 3.42 5.56p 7.51 11.19 1.02 22.07 7.05 11.93
Nevada 4.03 6.10 3.94 6.40 8.65 12.88 1.06 35.45 3.66 15.47
New Hampshire 2.24 2.69 1.47 2.39 3.23 4.80 0.49 14.96 0.56 7.47
New Jersey 1.33 1.29 0.23 0.37 0.50 0.74 0.25 6.65 0.00 3.21
New Mexico 1.58 1.47 0.08 0.13 0.18 0.27 0.33 6.61 0.00 2.73
New York 1.45 1.29 0.32 0.51 0.69 1.03 0.30 5.59 0.01 3.49
North Carolina 1.27 1.18 0.27 0.43 0.59 0.88 0.25 5.54 0.01 3.25
North Dakota 4.47 8.49 5.66 9.19 12.42 18.49 2.08 34.90 10.81 69.57
Ohio 2.29 2.74 1.96 3.18 4.30 6.41 0.67 11.23 3.51 6.26
Oklahoma 2.50 3.68 2.64 4.29 5.79 8.63 0.92 14.82 5.51 16.02
Oregon 4.87 10.76 7.69 12.49 16.88 25.13 1.95 59.85 15.71 52.37
Pennsylvania 2.21 3.00 2.01 3.26 4.40 6.56 0.57 15.87 2.06 7.43
Rhode Island 0.84 0.64 0.17 0.28 0.37 0.56 0.18 2.29 0.01 1.76
South Carolina 1.58 1.48 0.85 1.38 1.86 2.77 0.37 6.07 0.41 4.02
South Dakota 3.81 5.57 3.82 6.20 8.38 12.48 1.49 20.93 7.63 26.63
Texas 2.00 1.72 1.07 1.73 2.34 3.48 0.48 6.27 0.71 4.53
Utah 4.62 8.03 5.70 9.26 12.52 18.64 1.45 44.76 10.60 19.15
Vermont 2.46 2.78 2.02 3.29 4.44 6.61 0.76 10.27 4.03 6.58
Virginia 2.01 1.94 1.20 1.95 2.63 3.92 0.48 7.86 0.76 5.09
Washington 3.09 5.61 4.09 6.65 8.98 13.38 0.99 32.13 8.12 13.57
West Virginia 2.01 2.04 1.20 1.95 2.63 3.92 0.47 8.88 0.60 5.50
Wisconsin 3.72 6.96 4.76 7.72 10.43 15.53 1.67 29.21 9.27 52.61
Wyoming 8.22 77.09 20.07 32.57 44.02 65.54 17.66 339.82 21.51 3408.97aCV refers to contingent valuation (survey) methods; TC refers to travel-cost (Hotelling-Clawson-Knetch) methods.
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TABLE 6: 
COMPARING PREVIOUS ESTIMATES OF THE VALUE OF A FRESHWATER
RECREATIONAL FISHING DAY WITH THOSE DERIVED IN THIS STUDY
State
Previous Estimates Valuation from this











Alabama TC Trout King and Hof 1985 24.57 5.86
[5.22 32.14]
Arizona TC All Miller and Hay 1980 73.14  2.90
[1.09 5.14]
Colorado CV Cold water Walsh, et. al. 1980 22.01 10.40
[10.01 30.38]











Maine TC All Miller and Hay 1980 48.06 4.43
[2.73 6.88]
Minnesota TC All Miller and Hay 1980 60.60 18.80
[13.34 305.88]
Missouri TC Trout Haas & Weithman 1982 27.97 4.86
[4.62 8.06]
Ohio TC Cold water
Perch/Walleye
Dutta 1984
Hushak, et. al. 1988
8.73
4.58/5.60








Wisconsin TC All Kealy and Bishop 1986 51.60 11.55
[10.37 52.00]21
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